Book Review: From guns to government: the IRA in context by Ó Beacháin, Donnacha
www.ssoar.info
Book Review: From guns to government: the IRA in
context
Ó Beacháin, Donnacha
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Rezension / review
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Ó Beacháin, D. (2014). Review of the book The IRA: the Irish Republican Army, by J. Dingley. Studies of Transition
States and Societies, 6(1), 68-74. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-390631
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Book Review: 
From Guns to Government: The IRA in context
Donnacha Ó Beacháin*
The IRA: The Irish Republican Army by James Dingley, 2012, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Why is the IRA important?
When asked to review a book on Irish republicanism, the first question that springs to mind is what 
new does it add to the already impressive library of knowledge on the subject? There has been no 
shortage of books and articles on Irish nationalism/republicanism during the last century, particularly 
after the eruption of the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ in 1969 (e.g. Anderson, 2002; Beresford, 1989; 
Bowyer Bell, 1979, 1997; Coogan, 2000, 2002; Cronin, 1972, 1980; English, 1994, 2002; Grant, 2012; Hanley, 
2002; Moloney, 2003; Kelley, 1998; Maguire, 2008; Mahon, 2008; McCarthy, 2007; O’Donnell, 2012; Ó 
Beacháin, 2010; Regan, 1999; Taylor, 1997, 2002). Once a zone of what seemed an intractable conflict, 
Northern Ireland is now regularly touted as a model of conflict resolution with erstwhile adversaries 
sharing power. In his seminal Interpreting Northern Ireland, John Whyte (1991) calculated that at the 
time of publication there were 7000 major works relating to the Northern Ireland conflict. The volume 
has proliferated further since then. Learning more about the Irish republican movement, which has 
journeyed from armed resistance to government power, is surely helpful in understanding how peace 
can be forged in regions dogged by war. In his authoritatively titled The IRA: The Irish Republican Army 
Dingley acknowledges that the literature is numerous and diverse but argues that there has been a 
dearth of works attempting to theoretically analyse the Irish Republican Army. However, anyone seeking 
answers as to how Irish republicans constituted one of the most formidable guerrilla movements of 
their time and managed to engage the British, Irish and American governments in a peace process that 
has now endured for two decades, will be disappointed by James Dingley’s polemical tract.
Explaining conflict in Northern Ireland
Dingley approaches the Northern Ireland imbroglio with a question that has been asked of many 
conflict zones – what is it that makes some people rebel? The repressive character of the state, its 
pervasive discrimination against the minority forced in 1920 to be part of the new Northern Ireland 
regime, is de-emphasised in favour of a pseudo-psychological presentation of Irish nationalists. 
Dingley’s basic thesis is quite simple. There was/is a modernising, progressive, inclusive, prosperous 
and generous British system, which extends to Ireland. It has been based on reason, science, and 
industry. However, there is a faction in Northern Ireland – variously described as Irish Republicans, 
Nationalists, and Catholics – who, blinded by emotion and irrational hatred for contemporary society, 
have spurned the fruits of modernity for some inward-looking frugality.1 They have also been woefully 
under-educated, particularly in the sciences, and therefore unable to participate fully in a modern 
society, such as the one offered in Northern Ireland by the British state. Lest it appear that I have 
somehow misrepresented or caricatured the author’s thesis let me quote from the book:
1 Throughout the book and this review Irish ‘Catholics’ and ‘Nationalists’, and ‘Protestants’ and ‘Unionists’, are 
used interchangeably. This is in part because the vast majority of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland 
vote for nationalist and unionist parties respectively. The conflict, however, has not been at heart a theological 
or religious one.
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the PIRA can be seen as a blind child lashing out at a world it could not understand or find a place … 
Where men do not have the scientific or technical skills to analyse, comprehend, or enter the modern 
world, they violently react against it, staving it off in favour of ‘alternative’ values or simply to draw 
attention to their alienated selves. Whereas science and rationalism extol calm analytical and calculated 
understanding, alternative values imply the opposite – namely emotion, passion and violence. Irish 
Nationalism and Catholicism consistently rejected science, modernity and industry. Few Republicans 
(even fewer PIRA members) had any substantive education, especially of a scientific nature. [p. 108-9]
When resistance to the state is considered in terms of a childish tantrum by those ill-equipped to 
live in the modern world, there is no need – and certainly this book feels no need – to interrogate the 
state itself or its repressive apparatus. 
The illusion of oppression and the modernising zeal of imperial rule
The book’s first page boldly states that it will look at problems confronting “the men who made 
up the IRA”, at a stroke airbrushing out the women who were involved in that movement. Things 
rapidly go downhill from there. Chapters 2 and 3 provide a potted history of Ireland throughout which 
Dingley clearly has a normative appreciation for enlightening British imperialism over the inward-
looking, self-pitying Irish nationalism. As the notion that Britain was a democratising force against 
an irrational and/or terrorist opposition is so deeply engrained, it requires stretching facts to fit the 
narrative. Thus, the republican claim to achieving a mandate for self-determination in 1918 can not be 
entertained for “Sinn Féin won only 48 per cent of all Irish votes cast (68% in what became the South 
of Ireland), and rumours of widespread electoral malpractice abounded” [p. 55]. This statistic cited is 
accurate but deceptive. What it (no doubt deliberately) omits is the fact that in 25 constituencies – all 
Sinn Féin strongholds – republican parliamentarians were returned without a contest thus obviating 
the necessity of votes being cast. In fact, Sinn Féin took 70% of the seats in Ireland, north and south, 
and a further half dozen constituencies were won by parliamentarians committed to autonomy for 
Ireland. As for the rumours of electoral malpractice, the author does not feel obliged to supply any 
sources.
The war of independence involves the IRA murdering many people, while the British forces merely 
kill. On Bloody Sunday, for example, Dingley recounts how the IRA murdered 14 “alleged Crown 
agents” and 2 RIC officers who, we are told, were all unarmed, in their beds and wearing pyjamas. 
The British army in response killed 12 ‘individuals’ watching a football match, and we are helpfully 
informed that “the association between Gaelic sports and the IRA was well recognised” [p. 57]. For the 
revolutionary period, Dingley relies heavily on the controversial historian Peter Hart, who is quoted 
liberally without reference to the vigorous debate surrounding his findings.2 Chapter 3 concludes that 
“the anti-Treaty individuals were those with no jobs or career prospects in the new Free State” [p. 74]. 
In this Dingley puts the cart before the horse. Individuals did not oppose the Treaty because they had 
no jobs or prospects. Rather they had no job or prospects in the new order for the very reason that 
they opposed it. While there was a class dimension to the Treaty division, the civil war split families 
and communities. We can hardly assume that the family member with prospects backed the Treaty 
and his or her feckless sibling cast his lot in with the ‘irregulars’.3
Rather than seeing Irish republican resistance as resulting from British government misrule, 
Dingley concludes that they “rejected modernizing British values, which became objects of hate” 
[p. 74]. Consequently, he has a problem recognising that there was any real oppression of the Irish. 
2 See for example Murphy and Meehan (2008).
3 Subsequent splits within the republican movement, with the exception of that in 1969-70 receive scant atten-
tion in the book. For an account of the 1926 split see Ó Beacháin (2009).
70 Donnacha Ó Beacháin
Their largely imaginary grievances were those of a people insufficiently rational to appreciate that by 
residing in the United Kingdom they had won the winning ticket in the lottery of life. Dingley writes 
of “an Irish nationalism that is acutely Catholic in identity and emphasises centuries of persecution 
and suffering for which there is often little empirical evidence. As often happens when there is little 
empirical substance, emotions fill the void and lead to grossly distorted views” [p. 83]. We are told 
that Catholics “felt like second-class citizens in a Protestant state” [p. 90] as opposed to the fact 
that they were treated that way. The famine of the 19th century “became another symbol of British 
‘oppression’, of starving Irishmen forced to leave their homes for foreign lands” [p. 43]. For some 
reason, ‘oppression’ is in inverted commas. Derry’s Bloody Sunday in 1972 is explained away by 
reiterating the now discredited view that emphasises the illegality of the civil rights march and the 
perception of the British paratroopers that they were fired on first, so that the marchers were killed 
“in disputed circumstances” [p. 98].
Anti-Catholic discrimination is described in the book as “an article of faith among Nationalists”, 
implying it was a belief rather than a state-sponsored reality. Furthermore, Dingley argues that 
“Catholics were equally adept at discriminating” [p. 91]. To sustain this claim, he writes that the 
Nationalist Party leader Eddie McAteer employed 60 people at his business during the 1960s, all of 
whom were Catholic. But to maintain that this in some way implies parity of injustice is absurd. 
If the state was not employing Catholics as a matter of policy and was encouraging Protestants 
to do likewise, it would be ridiculous for Catholics not to use the very few opportunities they had 
to employ fellow Catholics. Otherwise Catholic unemployment would have been even greater. The 
reality of economic discrimination pervaded every aspect of Catholic life in Northern Ireland. The 
Catholic unemployment rate was 2.5 times that of Protestants,4 while the rate of emigration was 
2.4 times higher.5 While extolling the privileges bestowed by the British welfare state, Dingley makes 
no mention of the fact that the Unionist government at Stormont tried to prevent its extension to 
Northern Ireland, as they knew that the chief beneficiaries would be Catholic nationalists.
Why was Northern Ireland created and how was it governed?
Dingley writes that “Catholics in Northern Ireland were actually denied very few rights, having 
the same rights as anywhere in the United Kingdom” [p. 91]. It is difficult to reconcile such a bold 
statement with the reality that Unionist control in Northern Ireland was consolidated by the arbitrary 
distribution of employment at state and local level to their co-religionists and by the allocation of 
public consumption benefits, particularly in the area of housing. At state level, the bureaucracy was 
almost entirely Protestant in composition with Protestants holding 91.6% of all civil service positions 
in 1927, a figure that had increased to 95.4% in 1959 (Barrett & Carter, 1962, p. 96). Successive Stormont 
Prime Ministers and Unionist leaders exhorted their followers to emulate the example that the 
Government had set. Sir Basil Brooke, who was Prime Minister from 1943-63, was reported by his own 
newspaper the Fermanagh Times as stating that:
… a great number of Protestants and Orangemen … employed Roman Catholics. He felt he could speak 
freely on the subject as he had not a Roman Catholic about his own place (cheers). He appreciated this 
great difficulty experienced by some of them in procuring suitable Protestant labour, but he would point 
4 The 1971 figures were 17.3% Catholic male unemployment compared to 6.6% for Protestant males. The figures 
for female unemployment were 13.9% Catholic, 5.6% Protestant. Fair Employment Agency, Second Report of the 
FEA for Northern Ireland, 1 April 1977 – 31 March 1978 (FEA, Belfast, 1979) p. 8. I would like to thank the late Bob 
Cooper, Chairman of the FEA 1976-1990 and of the Fair Employment Commission 1990-1999, for making these 
reports available to me.
5 Figure calculated from Simpson (1983, p. 102). Between 1961 and 1971 Catholics emigrated at a rate of 6.9 per 
1,000 per annum compared to a rate of 2.8 for Protestants. See also Walsh (1970).
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out that the Roman Catholics were endeavouring to get in everywhere and were out with all their force 
and might to destroy Ulster. There was a definite plot to overpower Unionists in the North. He would 
therefore appeal to Unionists wherever possible to employ good Protestant lads and lassies (cheers).
[quoted in Peled, 2014, p. 27]
Brooke later clarified his comment by saying that “when I made that declaration last ‘twelfth’ I 
did so after careful consideration. What I said was justified. I recommended people not to employ 
Roman Catholics, who were 99 per cent disloyal” (Belfast News Letter, 1934, March 20). When asked by 
Cahir Healy, the MP for South Fermanagh, whether Brooke’s speech represented Government policy, 
the then Prime Minister James Craig told parliament that Brooke had spoken “as a Member of His 
Majesty’s Government” and that “there is not one of my colleagues who does not entirely agree with 
him” (Northern Ireland House of Commons, 1934).
The Northern Ireland state was sectarian in concept and in practice. In order to satisfy the demands 
of a regional majority and preserve British hegemony, a new regime was established ostensibly to 
protect an 18% minority, while simultaneously creating a new minority that constituted 34% of the 
population. In not one of the six counties was the unionist majority greater than the nationalist 
majority in Ireland as a whole. Partition did not separate two peoples that could not live peaceably 
together. It brought them closer together.
With the partition of Ireland, northern nationalists found themselves transformed into an artificial 
minority that could never aspire to exercising or enjoying political power for the very reason that the 
system was constructed to thwart this very eventuality. Moreover, they were to be entrusted to the 
care of a new regime that, like its predecessor, treated their culture, heritage and beliefs as hostile and 
subversive. They were to be subjects of a state that from its inception would rely upon armed partisans 
and repressive legislation to enforce its authority. The manipulation of ‘problematic’ electoral wards 
was executed with remarkable efficiency so that whereas nationalists controlled twenty five of the 
eighty local councils in the North in 1920, in 1924, they controlled only two.
The aim of partition was clearly to produce unionist rule in perpetuity even in areas with nationalist 
majorities (Lee, 1989, p. 113). As Michael McDonald (1986, p. 55) has cogently argued, partition 
institutionalised the colonial dynamic “driving Catholics from positions of authority, encouraging the 
Catholic disloyalty that justified the hegemony of Protestant loyalists”. But rather than sufficiently 
contextualise the root causes of the conflict, Dingley describes an exotic species, the ‘men of violence’, 
who like King Canute struggle futilely to push back the tide, an anachronism trying to stem the 
inevitable progress of humanity:
Thus much of PIRA’s violence may be regarded as acting out deeply ingrained socio-religious messages 
and symbolism against a Unionist and/or modern world that PIRA members found incomprehensible, as 
well as a moral community from which they felt excluded. [p. 109]
Dingley is keen to point out that nationalists excluded themselves from Northern Ireland as they 
“erected [their] own cultural and political barriers to participating in northern society” [p. 91]. It is not 
considered that rather than nationalists finding the Northern Ireland state incomprehensible, they 
understood its raison d’etre very well. In another passage, Dingley writes:
One needs to clearly visualize PIRA’s position. A bunch of backstreet boys, most having left school 
before they were 16 years old, who had never lived outside their own neighbourhoods, with no electoral 
mandate (in either North or South) or administrative or governmental experience, had decided that 
they alone constituted the only legitimate government of the entire island of Ireland. It was more like 
the plot for a Marx Brothers or Carry On film [author’s italics]. [p. 110]
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The mystery left untouched is why such a group was considered worthy of negotiations that 
involved the British, Irish and US governments, and how many republicans went on to serve in senior 
political positions on both sides of the Irish border. At the time of writing, Sinn Féin is in government 
in Northern Ireland, and in the European elections of May 2014 the party took the largest share of 
the vote in Ireland. Dingley never attempts to square this circle. How did these loutish ill-educated 
hoodlums, steeped (according to Dingley) in German romanticism, Greek scholasticism and Gaelic 
sophistry, journey to the centre of politics in both jurisdictions in Ireland? As the question does not 
fit the narrative nor its underlying assumptions, it is never embraced. Instead, the book takes refuge 
in the ‘men of violence’ caricature, propagated during the Troubles, of people wedded to force as a 
means without providing the necessary context that has made Ireland a site of conflict for centuries. 
By contrast, the violence of the British state, which was implemented through a panoply of oppressive 
legislation, is considered by Dingley to have been sensible and necessary to combat an irrational 
terrorist threat emanating from the Irish republican community. He writes that:
Lack of clear, rational thought leaves wide-open spaces for emotional expression, such as violence … 
most Republican minds [were] notoriously hostile to rational analysis … [they] saw violence as pure, 
unmediated, and direct from the soul, in contrast to science, which was viewed as artificial, constructed, 
and material … The strategic aim of much violence became simply violence, as the expression and 
emotional outlet of frustrated feeling and aspirations. Real solutions to real problems in a complex 
world require great thought, analytical skill and extensive training. [p. 112]
There is nothing intrinsically new in this depiction. It simply echoes the caricature of the wild, 
unstable, emotional Irishman that justified repression and camouflaged a coercive strategy rooted in 
dispossession. Scientific racism flourished in Victorian Britain and was applied liberally to explain the 
impoverished rebellious people on the periphery of the United Kingdom. Citing the Celts generally and 
the Irish in particular, the anatomist Robert Knox noted their “furious fanaticism; a love of war and 
disorder; a hatred for order and patient industry; no accumulative habits; restless, treacherous and 
uncertain” (quoted in Curtis, 1968, p. 70). Punch wrote of the ‘Irish Yahoo’ who “sallies forth in states 
of excitement, and attacks civilized human beings that have provoked its fury”(quoted in Curtis, 1971, 
p. 100). The stereotype is not new. The only surprising thing is that it resurfaces in a book published in 
the 21st century by a mainstream academic publisher.
Concluding Points
At its heart, the book labours under a basic and irredeemable flaw. It does not understand its subject. 
It is very much an outsider account but without the virtues of detachment and objectivity that 
sometimes come with observing from afar. The book is a poorly executed attempt to present partisan 
assumptions as the product of scholarly inquiry.
Remarkably, no republicans – be they former members of the IRA or of Sinn Féin – seem to have 
been interviewed by the author in the preparation of this book. There are thousands of former 
activists available for interview now that the conflict has subsided, but for some reason Dingley did 
not consider it necessary to interview them. At the end of chapter 6, which deals with IRA weapons 
and targets, Dingley inserts a special acknowledgment to “security sources who cannot be named 
but to whom I am indebted” and from whom much of the information for the chapter was obtained. 
While certainly it is of interest to gain the perspective of the British/Northern Ireland security forces, it 
is quite bizarre to base an analysis of the IRA exclusively on the testimony of its erstwhile adversaries 
and without recourse to republicans themselves.
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Moreover, despite the existence of a wealth of archival material relating to the IRA and the 
Northern Ireland conflict, none seems to have been consulted. There is the Public Record Office of 
Northern Ireland, the British National Archives at Kew Gardens, the National Archives of Ireland, the 
National Library of Ireland, not to mention some useful archives in the United States such as the 
national archives in Maryland.
The fact that simple words such as Sinn Féin, Dáil Éireann, Saor Éire are misspelt throughout the 
book without the necessary fádas only emphasises the unfamiliarity and/or lack of respect for things 
Irish. It is notable, by contrast, that words in other languages foreign to the author, such as German 
and Latin, are italicised.
There are many ways that one can try to better understand the motives and actions of the IRA. 
Certainly, this deeply flawed book is not the place to start.
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